The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), established in 1975, provides evidence-based policy solutions to sustainably end hunger and malnutrition and reduce poverty. The Institute conducts research, communicates results, optimizes partnerships, and builds capacity to ensure sustainable food production, promote healthy food systems, improve markets and trade, transform agriculture, build resilience, and strengthen institutions and governance. Gender is considered in all of the Institute's work. IFPRI collaborates with partners around the world, including development implementers, public institutions, the private sector, and farmers' organizations, to ensure that local, national, regional, and global food policies are based on evidence. IFPRI is a member of the CGIAR Consortium.
INTRODUCTION
The targeted public distribution system (TPDS) of India is the largest food safety-net program in the world. It delivered 51.3 million tons of rice and wheat at subsidized prices (Ramaswami, Murugkar, and Kotwal 2013) to 530 million people in 2011/12. In June 1997, the government of India replaced the erstwhile universal public distribution system (PDS) with a TPDS 1 . Before 1997, all households that owned ration cards could buy fixed quantities of rice, wheat, sugar, and kerosene at the same subsidized rates from their designated fair-price shops. This changed after the introduction of TPDS. At the time, 60 million households were classified as below the poverty line (BPL). BPL households were entitled to 20 kg or rice or wheat per month at a cost of 5.65 and 4.15 Indian national rupees (Rs) per kilogram, respectively. Later, in December 2000, 10 million of the poorest of the poor households were identified as beneficiaries of the Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY).
2 They get 35 kg of wheat or rice per month at Rs 2 or Rs 3 per kilogram. The above poverty line (APL) households have to pay higher prices-Rs 8.3 per kilogram of rice and Rs 6.1 per kilogram of wheat. The Indian government introduced TPDS to control the growing food subsidy and to improve its targeting.
3 However, even after this change, food subsidy continued to grow apace and remained poorly targeted. 4 State governments in India, which are responsible for implementing the TPDS, have struggled to implement a narrowly targeted scheme. Identifying AAY and BPL households and reaching them has proved immensely difficult. Gross errors of misidentification have been made. For example, in 2011/2012, more than half of all households in the lowest three deciles of monthly per capita consumption expenditure (MPCE) did not have AAY or BPL cards, while nearly 16 percent of the richest households in the top decile of MPCE had them (authors' own estimates from 68th round of consumption survey by the National Sample Survey Organization, NSSO). Additionally, more than 40 percent of the total subsidized rice and wheat meant for distribution to households through fair-price shops gets diverted to open markets (Gulati et al. 2012 .
A few years ago, some states in India, like Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, and Tamil Nadu, evolved what Drèze and Sen (2013) call a "new-style" PDS with the provision of rice at very low prices (Rs 0-2/kg) for a large fraction of their population. The origin of the idea to loosen targeting can be attributed to Tamil Nadu, where the PDS is universal (Drèze and Sen 2013) . The new-style PDS combines low prices and near universal targeting with increased administrative effort to ensure timely availability of food grains in their fair-price shops and to control diversion of highly subsidized grains to the open market.
Recent surveys show significant improvement in the PDS in these states. For example, a survey of 900 households in eight districts of Chhattisgarh showed that 92 percent of respondents received their full quota of food grains and 97 percent of the respondents were satisfied with the food quality (Khera 2011b) . The 66th round of consumption survey by NSSO also revealed that 9 out of 10 households in the bottom three consumption deciles of Chhattisgarh used PDS to buy rice-the staple grain-and their average offtake level was close to their entitlement of 35 kg/month. Overall, nearly 75 percent of rural households in the state receive 35 kg of rice from the PDS every month at highly subsidized rates (Drèze and Sen 2013) . Khera (2009) found that better access to subsidized rice from fair-price shops has resulted in major reduction in self-reported measures of hunger in Chhattisgarh. Similarly, Drèze and Khera 1 http://dfpd.nic.in/?q=node/101 ). 2 AAY is a program sponsored by the government to reduce hunger among the poorest of BPL families. Today, there are 242 million AAY families and 65 million BPL families in India (http://dfpd.nic.in/?q=node/101 ). 3 Originally, it was proposed that BPL households would get food grains (mainly rice and wheat) at half the economic cost and APL households at 80 percent of the economic cost (Sharma 2012) , but the prices have not been revised even as the economic cost of grains distributed through TPDS has increased rapidly over the years. As per NSSO data we estimate that the percentage of BPL card-holding households increased from 22 percent to 31 percent between 2004/2005 and 2011/2012 2004/2005 and 2009/2010 , the percentage of all households in India using PDS increased from 24 percent to 39 percent to buy rice, and from 11 percent to 28 percent to buy wheat. The share of PDS purchase in total household consumption also roughly doubled: from 13.0 percent to 23.5 percent for rice and from 7.3 percent to 14.6 percent for wheat. Additionally, the estimated diversion of grains from PDS to open market came down from 54 percent of total offtake from the central pool in 2004 /2005 to 40 percent in 2009 /2010 (Gulati et al. 2012 . Drèze and Sen (2013 attribute this general improvement in TPDS to the rise in cereal prices in open markets after the global food crisis in 2008/2009 and the increased difference between the prices of rice and wheat in fair-price shops and in the open market. As the price difference increased, more families have turned to the PDS for rice and wheat.
Given the coincident improvement in TPDS across India in the last few years, a question arises: How much of this increase in offtake of subsidized grains by intended consumers (and the corresponding decrease in leakage) in states that implemented the "new-style" PDS should be attributed to higher subsidy and less targeting?
This is an important policy question for at least two reasons. First, providing cereals nearly free to a large population has high fiscal costs. Whether benefits will exceed the cost is yet to be ascertained. Second, the National Food Security Act (NFSA), approved by the Parliament of India in September 2013, follows the new-style PDS model of providing cheaper grains to a larger population. Its main provision legally entitles two-thirds of India's total population of 125 billion to 5 kg of rice, wheat, or coarse cereals per month at highly subsidized prices of Rs 1-3 (16-50 US cents) per kilogram. In essence, this provision seeks to extend the policy strategies of states such as Chhattisgarh and Tamil Nadu to all of India. A careful assessment of how the PDS in these states improved as a result of these strategies, therefore, give us a sense of the effect that the NFSA may have after it is implemented.
We compare the average quantity of rice purchased per month by households from fair-price shops-between states that made their public distribution system more generous and inclusive and other states that did not-before and after the implementation of reforms (difference-in-difference) to estimate the difference made by changes in the TPDS.
Policy changes that characterize the new-style PDS started at different times in different states. However, looking at the average price of rice paid by all households that bought it from fair-price shops in 2009/2010 provides an interesting comparison. The average price was below Rs 3/kg-the price set by the NFSA-in five states: Andhra Pradesh (Rs 2.0), Chhattisgarh (Rs 2.0), Odisha (Rs 2.1), Tamil Nadu (Rs 1.0), and West Bengal (Rs 2.7). The average price remained at a higher level-closer to the central issue price-in all other states of India ( That the average price of rice paid for by all PDS buyers, including the APL buyers, in these states was below Rs 3/kg in 2009/2010 6 suggests that grains were being provided cheaper than the central issue price to many more households than originally recognized as AAY and BPL by the government of India.
Having identified the treatment states, we ask two questions:
• Has making TPDS more inclusive and generous resulted in an increase in the average quantity of rice purchased from fair-price shops in these five states? If so, by how much more than the trend increase in the rest of India? • What is the impact of increase in access to cheaper rice in these five states on household consumption of other food items? We use the difference-in-difference technique and data from various rounds of consumption surveys conducted by the NSSO to answer these questions.
A large body of work exists on the nutritional impact of food prices and food subsidy-both in India and in other countries. In India, Kochar (2005) showed a small effect of PDS subsidy on calorie intake. More recently, Kaushal and Muchomba (2013, 24) also find that increase in food subsidy after expansion of TPDS in 2002 had "a negligible to negative effect on calorie and protein intake and no statistically significant effect on fat intake." In China, too, Jensen and Miller (2011) do not find any overall improvement in nutrition due to food price subsidy.
Our results are qualitatively different from much of the published literature on the effect of the food subsidy on dietary intake of households in India. We find that changes in the public distribution system led to a significant increase in the percentage of households who purchased subsidized rice in four out of the five states. Not only that, an average household in these states purchased 3 kg more rice per month from fair-price shops than its counterpart in nontreated states as a result of the introduction of a more generous and more inclusive PDS. We see the largest impact in Chhattisgarh, the poster state for the new-style PDS. We also find that households used money saved on rice to buy more pulses, edible oil, vegetables, and sugar. Thus, increase in cereal subsidy also led to improvement in diet quality.
Our results may be different from the published papers, but they are similar to the findings of newer studies that use data from more recent years in India. Like ours, these studies also find a positive impact of increase in PDS subsidy on calorie intake and diet quality (Kaul 2013; Krishnamurthy, Pathania, and Tandon 2014) . Kaul (2013) estimates that an increase in the value of the PDS subsidy by 1 percent increases caloric intake by 0.144 percent, while an increase of 1 percent in income (expenditure) is associated with an increase of 0.4 percent in caloric intake. Her projections suggest that the NFSA will increase the per person caloric intake of the present beneficiaries of the program by 72 calories per day in urban area and 66 calories per day in rural areas.
We see positive and significant effects of PDS expansion in more recent data, perhaps because the subsidy is now much higher than what Jensen and Miller offered in their experiments in China (8-25 percent) and even in the TPDS expansion in India in 2002 that Kochar (2005) and Kaushal and Muchomba (2013) analyzed. 
DATA
We use data from various rounds of NSSO household consumption surveys. NSSO collects recall data on consumption expenditure from a representative sample of just over 100,000 households from all over India every five years. These large five-yearly survey rounds are called "thick" rounds. 8 We compile data from five rounds of NSSO consumption surveys corresponding to years 1992/1993, 1999/2000, 2004/2005, 2009/2010, and 2011/2012 . This gives us consumption data from a repeated cross-section of more than one-half million households 9 covering all states and union territories of India over a period of two decades.
In each round, NSSO collects recall data on quantity and value of more than 300 items consumed by the household in the last 30 days. For rice and wheat (and also for sugar and kerosene), the survey collects data separately for quantity purchased from fair-price shops and price paid in the fair-price shops. The data on purchases from fair-price shops allow us to analyze the performance of PDS and the impact of changes in PDS policies in some states of India. Timings of the 61st and the 66th round of consumption survey, carried out in 2004/2005 and 2009/2010 , respectively, are especially appropriate for us because all five states significantly reduced the price of rice and increased the number of beneficiary households in the interval between these two rounds. Thus, between these two rounds of the NSSO survey, we have data from both before and after the policy changes.
Data from the earlier rounds of NSSO's consumption survey allow us to test for parallel trends in variables of our interest between these five states and other states of India.
10 Parallel trends are necessary between the treatment and control groups before the policy change so that estimates from difference-indifference method can be reliable (Angrist and Pischke 2009 ).
ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY
We are interested in knowing if the average quantity of rice purchased from fair-price shops between 2004/2005 and 2009/2010 has increased greater in the five treatment states than in other states of India. If so, by how much? We use the difference-in-difference method to answer this question.
The first difference compares this outcome for the five treatment states-Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, West Bengal, and Tamil Nadu-between 2004/2005 (before) and 2009/2010 (after) . Since this difference across time is confounded by a number of other changes taking place in India's food markets, such as the rising price of food in open markets without any corresponding increase in price in fair-price shops, we use other states of India as a control group. These other states of India serve as control group because they also experienced an increase in the price of grains in the open market but did not make the PDS more inclusive and more generous. However, one common problem of a multistate treatment-effect analysis is the heterogeneity of the pretreated and newly treated groups (Nandi and Deolalikar 2013; Betrand, 2004) . States in India are different from each other in many respects. We control for time-invariant heterogeneity using fixed effects, but we do not control for time-varying heterogeneity, which may be important in this case. We do test for parallel trends assumption, both parametrically and graphically, and find evidence for it, which gives us some confidence in our econometric strategy. Still, the problem of imperfect controls remains. Kaushal and Muchomba (2013) and Nandi and Deolalikar (2013) are other recent papers that have used similar econometric strategy to exploit interstate differences in social policies in India to measure their impact on households.
The difference-in-difference impact of implementing these new-style PDS reforms is estimated by
where Y is the outcome variable of interest corresponding to household h, in state s and time t. A is an indicator of being an after-treatment year (2009/2010); T is a dummy for being in a treated cohort (Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, West Bengal, and Tamil Nadu). 3gives us the difference-indifference estimate of the impact of being exposed to the PDS reform policy. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. Since outcomes could vary by household characteristics, we add controls for household demographics (caste, religion, household type, household size, and age of the household head) and for socioeconomic status (household head education, female-headed households, marital status of the household head, ownership and cultivation of land, and total monthly consumption expenditure of the household). In addition to capturing variations in the outcomes, adding controls improves the accuracy of our estimates by decreasing the residual variation to be explained. We show results both with and without household controls. Our preferred estimates, however, are the ones with the complete set of household controls.
We also use the same econometric strategy to measure the impact of increase in subsidy of rice on average household expenditure on other food and nonfood items. It is important to point out that even in 2004/2005, a much higher portion of households bought grains from fair-price shops in the five treatment states (47 percent versus 20 percent for poor households and 33 percent versus 10 percent for nonpoor) and the average monthly offtake of grains was also significantly higher there (Table 4 .1). Thus, these states had a much better public distribution system to start with-even before they had fully implemented the new policy of higher subsidies for more households.
RESULTS

Changes in PDS Prices and Coverage
There was a significant improvement in coverage of TPDS-measured by the fraction of all households reporting purchase of rice or wheat from fair-price shops and the average quantity of grain purchased per household per month-in both the treatment and the nontreatment states from 2004/2005 to 2009/2010. This improvement, however, was much bigger in treatment states. Thus, the coverage of TPDS improved much more in treatment states-from their already higher levels of coverage.
What led to the increase in household coverage of average monthly offtake of grains from fairprice shops from 2004/2005 to 2009/2010, even in states where the TPDS did not become more inclusive or the grains did not become much cheaper? Drèze and Sen (2013) suggest that a steep increase in market prices of rice and wheat increased the value of PDS entitlements as the PDS prices remained the same or were even reduced in some states. The increased value of PDS entitlements gave people a much greater stake in the system and increased its utilization across India. Figure 4 .1 seems to support the Sen and Drèze conjecture. It shows that across years, the percentage of all households purchasing grains from fairprice shops increased along with the increase in the gap between the market and the fair-price shops' prices of grains.
11 APL, BPL, and AAY households are assigned different types of ration cards color coded as blue, red, and yellow, respectively. NSSO asked respondents the type of ration card they had in the 61st round of the consumption survey in 2004/2005 but not in the 66th round in 2009/2010. We also created our own MPCE deciles separately for urban and rural areas of each state. For regression purposes we call the bottom three deciles poor and the top decile nonpoor.
12 http://dfpd.nic.in/?q=node/101 ). This increase in the gap between the market and the controlled price could also have led to an increase in diversion of grains from the PDS to the black market, but it did not. Interstate comparison shows that diversion of grains from PDS is lower in states where the price difference between open market and fair-price shops is higher (Figure 4 .2). This is a remarkable and somewhat counterintuitive pattern that we see, perhaps because states that committed more of their own resources to make PDS more inclusive and more subsidized also invested into administrative efforts to control diversion and improve delivery of grains to households. Without those efforts, making the system more inclusive and increasing the entitlement itself may not have achieved the positive outcomes. West Bengal-one of the five states in our treatment group-is a case in point. Like Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, and Tamil Nadu, West Bengal also reduced the price of PDS rice between 2004/2005 and 2009/2010 significantly below the central issue price. Yet unlike the other four states, it had hardly any increase in the household coverage of PDS or the average monthly offtake of rice from fair-price shops. We think that West Bengal had a different experience because, unlike in the other four states, its government did not invest in improving the logistics of supplying rice through the PDS. This is evident from reports of inadequate availability of rice in fair-price shops and corruption in the TPDS in the state (Sethi 2007) 13 and complaints from villagers about malpractices and bullying by ration shop dealers and irregular access to PDS provisions. 14 In West Bengal, the performance of PDS, as measured by the average monthly offtake quantity of rice from fair-price shops and the diversion of grains from PDS, did not improve much even after a significant reduction in PDS prices; while in Bihar, we see major improvements after 2009/2010 (Table  4 .2) even as subsidy and targeting levels remained unchanged there. Officers in the government of Bihar attribute these improvements to administrative efforts made to improve the functioning of the system. The comparison of performance of PDS in Bihar and West Bengal suggests that administrative reforms are necessary to make PDS more effective. Without administrative efforts, merely increasing subsidy or inclusiveness may not lead to a significant improvement. 
The Impact of More Generous PDS in Five States of India: Difference-in-Difference Results
This paper seeks to measure the impact of reforms that led to the establishment of the new-style PDS in five states of India between 2004/2005 and 2009/2010 . However, the PDS in India has undergone a broad-based improvement, possibly due to a rapid rise in market price of food grains during this period. The main challenge, therefore, is to separate the effect of reforms from this broad-based improvement seen everywhere in the country. We use the difference-in-difference method, as shown in Equation 1, for this purpose. We assess the impact of reforms on average monthly offtake of rice from PDS shops. 15 13 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Panel_blames_corrupt_PDS_for_kakus_food_riots/rssarticleshow/2639176.cms 14 http://www.downtoearth.org.in/content/pds-protests-west-bengal 15 We look into change in share of PDS in total consumption of rice because of the declining trend in household consumption of all cereals in India (Deaton and Drèze 2009 ). This declining trend would result in an underestimate of the impact of reforms if we looked only at the total offtake of rice from PDS shops. That is, the real impact of reforms would have been larger (when measured in kilograms of rice purchased from fair price shops) if the household consumption of rice was not going
Test for Parallel Trends
The difference-in-difference estimate is valid only if we show parallel trends in outcome variables between treatment and control groups in the pretreatment period (Angrist and Pischke 2009) . Establishing parallel trends requires data from more than two time periods. Therefore, we add data from the 50th and 55th rounds of the NSSO consumption survey, corresponding to years 1992/1993 and 1999/2000. The 55th round, however, is not comparable to other rounds before or after it because of a change in recall period that led to increased estimates of consumption expenditure in this round (Deaton 2003) . We plotted the average offtake of rice from fair-price shops per household (in kilograms) for treatment and control groups-both with and without using data from the 55th round. In either case, we see a somewhat parallel trend across the treatment and control groups until 2004/2005 . Figure 4 .3 shows plots without the data from 55th round. We also use a parametric test for parallel trends by estimating the following regression:
This is similar to the difference-in-difference regression (Equation 1), except that here the after-treatment variable, Ahst, is replaced by a continuous variable indicating the year, with year 1993/1994 coded as 1, 1999/2000 coded as 6, and 2004/2005 coded as 11. We present regression results in Table 4 .3. The interaction term in Equation 2, labeled parallel trends in the tables, is the variable of interest. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of parallel trends when the interaction term is statistically not significant. The coefficient on the interaction term is statistically not significant when we group all five treatment states together (column 1), or when we leave West Bengal out of the treatment group (column 2). When we compare each of the five treatment states individually with the rest of India (column 3), the interaction term is not significant only for Chhattisgarh and West Bengal and it is significant for the other three states (Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, and Tamil Nadu). We fail to reject the null hypothesis of parallel trends even when we classify respondents into poor and nonpoor households and test for parallel trends for the two groups separately.
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down over the years. 16 We classify households in the bottom three deciles of MPCE in each state as poor. The nonpoor are households in the top Source: Estimated by authors using data from 61st and 66th rounds of NSSO consumption surveys. Notes: PDS = public distribution system; kg = kilograms. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
The Difference-in-Difference Estimate of Impact of PDS Reforms in Five States of India
The difference-in-difference estimates (based on Equation 1) of the effect of an increase in subsidy of rice on the average household purchase of rice from fair-price shops is shown in the row labeled treatment effect of columns 1-4 in Table 4 .4. Columns 1 and 2 in the table show results with West Bengal included in the treatment group, and columns 3 and 4 exclude it. We control for household characteristics (Xhst) in columns 2 and 4, while columns 1 and 3 present results from regressions without household controls. The interaction term, labeled treatment effect, is our main variable of interest. It shows that making PDS more generous and inclusive resulted in increase in average monthly household purchase of PDS rice by 2.98 kg over and above the trend improvement in the rest of India. However, the effect is statistically significant only when West Bengal is not included in the treatment group.
We started by looking at the impact of PDS reforms in five states as one group. However, the treatment states are not homogenous. They vary considerably in the performance of PDS before the reforms started and the extent of reforms implemented there as measured by (a) the size of expansion in the number of beneficiary households and (b) the price at which rice was sold to targeted households after reforms. TPDS performed much better in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu than in Chhattisgarh and West Bengal in 2004/2005 . Further, Tamil Nadu made PDS universal again, while the other four states retained some targeting. The price of PDS rice was reduced to Rs 1/kg in Tamil Nadu and Rs 2/kg in Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Odisha. It was even higher in West Bengal.
Given these variations, it is natural that the reforms or the treatment we consider here will have varying impacts in these five states. Therefore, we re-estimate our difference-in-difference regressions shown earlier, this time without clubbing together data from the five treatment states into one group (Table 4.5). As noted earlier, we had found parallel trends in average household purchase of PDS rice only for West Bengal and Chhattisgarh. Results for others states, though shown in Table 4 .5, are less compelling. Disaggregated results show how grouping the five treatment states together, as we did earlier (in Table 4 .4), masks large interstate variation in the impact of PDS reforms across the five states. Dummies for the individual states in the second column indicate that the average household purchase of rice from fair-price shops was significantly higher in Tamil Nadu (10.9 kg), Andhra Pradesh (6.7 kg), and Chhattisgarh (3.8 kg) than in other states of India even in 2004/2005. TPDS in Odisha at par with in other parts of India, while it was worse than the rest of India in West Bengal. The policy of increasing subsidy on PDS rice led to a big increase in the average household purchase of rice from fair-price shops in Chhattisgarh (10.8 kg) and Odisha (7.7 kg) and a small increase in Andhra Pradesh (0.9 kg), but not in Tamil Nadu or West Bengal.
These results show that Chhattisgarh indeed deserves the status of the poster state for PDS reforms in India. Odisha is not far behind either. The nonresults in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal are for two opposite reasons: We do not see the impact in Tamil Nadu because PDS reforms had taken place much earlier than 2004/2005, our baseline year, when the state already had high household coverage and relatively high monthly offtake of rice from fair-price shops. Therefore we see a smaller price reduction in Tamil Nadu and smaller expansion in the number of beneficiary households between 2004/2005 and 2009/2010 and thus smaller improvements there. We do not see any impact in West Bengal because the increase in subsidy was not accompanied by improvement in logistics of rice distribution through the PDS and administrative reforms to improve delivery and control diversion.
The PDS reforms, which we explore in this paper, led to extension of the subsidy-previously available only to AAY beneficiaries-to more households even if they were not as poor. In effect, these reforms constituted a bigger policy shock for the nonpoor households than the poorest of the poor. In this part, we explore if the policy affected poor and nonpoor households differently. We do so by dividing households into two groups: The first group, the poor, consists of all rural households in the bottom three deciles of MPCE in a state; the second group, the nonpoor, has all households in the top MPCE decile.
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Our results in Table 4 1 ), is also larger for the poorer households (3.32 versus 1.57 kg), but it is not statistically significant for this group. It is statistically significant only for the nonpoor. Source: Estimated by authors using data from 61st and 66th rounds of NSSO consumption surveys. Notes: PDS = public distribution system; kg = kilograms. All regressions included household controls, not shown here. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
When we carry out the same exercise only for Chhattisgarh, the state where we find the largest impact, again we find that the reforms led to a much larger increase in offtake of PDS rice for the poorer households than the nonpoor ones (12.3 kg versus 3.2 kg, respectively). The coefficient for policy impact is statistically significant for both poor and nonpoor groups for Chhattisgarh. PDS reforms in Chhattisgarh helped households at all MPCE levels, including those in the top 10 percent of per capita consumption expenditure (Table 4 .7). (1 in 14) in the bottom three MPCE deciles had the yellow ration card that entitles a household to benefits of AAY. The other 92 percent households did not benefit from AAY even when they were desperately poor. PDS reforms extended the AAY privileges to all such households, thereby removing the errors of omission completely and resulting in a big increase in average monthly offtake of PDS rice by poor families. A less strict targeting policy can be expected to lead to fewer errors of inclusion or exclusion (Niehaus and Atanassova 2013) . Moreover, the average monthly offtake of rice of even AAY households increased after reforms from 27 kg to more than 30 kg per month. This improvement on the intensive margin also made a small contribution to the overall effect we see in Table  4 .7.
IMPACT OF INCREASED PDS ALLOCATION ON HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION BASKETS
The PDS in India subsidizes only cereals and sugar among all food items. Some researchers have argued that high subsidy for rice and wheat could also lead to lower dietary diversity-an undesirable outcome. In a recent op-ed, Desai (2014) We test the contention that increase in access to subsidized rice (or wheat) leads to lower consumption of noncereal food items using data from Chhattisgarh, the state where we find largest increase in purchase of subsidized rice from fair-price shops. We estimated that How did this additional (implicit) transfer affect household consumption patterns? Again, we use the difference-in-difference method to answer this question with data from the 61st and 66th rounds of NSSO's consumption survey. We run a separate regression for household consumption expenditure on each of the eight food groups (namely, cereals; pulses and pulse products; milk and milk products; edible oil; meat, eggs, and fish; fruits; vegetables; and sugar) for which NSSO collects data, on the bottom three deciles. We also estimate the effect of increase in PDS subsidy on the overall nonfood expenditure. Our regression results are shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2.   18 18 We check for parallel trends in consumption expenditure on these food groups and find no evidence for parallel trends; hence, we report the results of the difference-in-difference regressions for consumption items with caution. Regression results for tests are available upon request. We find that increased access to subsidized rice through TPDS resulted in reduced monthly household expenditure on cereals by Rs 194, which is very close to our estimated value of implicit transfer through TPDS. This saving was used to spend more money on the purchase of pulses (Rs 11), edible oil (Rs 39), vegetables (Rs 19), and sugar (Rs 19). We do not see statistically significant effects on household expenditure on dairy products; fruits; and meat, eggs, and fish. Thus, our results on the impact of PDS expansion are qualitatively different from the findings reported in Desai (2014) . Increase in access to subsidized rice from TPDS results in reallocation of the saved money to food items other than rice, which also results in increase in overall food intake and diet quality. In her job-market paper, Kaul (2013) also reports results similar to ours: Increase in the subsidy on rice does lead to an increase in the daily consumption of cereals, but it also has a positive effect on consumption of noncereal food items. Her estimates suggest that nearly half of the total increase in caloric intake due to increase in PDS subsidy comes from food items other than rice. Further, increase in purchase of subsidized rice in Chhattisgarh led to increase in expenditure not only on other food items but also on nonfood items and services-by Rs 74 per month per household (column 1 in Table 5 .2).
Thus, our analysis shows that increase in access to in-kind food subsidy, as provided by TPDS, may have an impact on household consumption patterns somewhat similar to what we would expect from a cash transfer program. It could lead to increase in expenditure not only on the subsidized items, as is widely assumed, but also on other nonsubsidized goods and services. Between 2004 Between /2005 Between and 2009 Between /2010 , some states in India implemented policy changes to extend access to cheap rice though TPDS-earlier available only to AAY beneficiaries-to more households, making their public distribution system less targeted and more inclusive. A few years later, in September 2013, the Parliament of India enacted the National Food Security Act (NFSA) to entitle two-thirds (67 percent) of India's total population 19 to 5 kg of coarse cereals, wheat, or rice every month at highly subsidized prices of Rs 1-3 (1.7-5.0 US cents) per kilogram. This provision of NFSA essentially emulates the expansion in TPDS undertaken a few years earlier in states such as Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Odisha and extends it to all of India. We try to estimate the effect of increased access to subsidized cereals through TPDS on household consumption pattern in these states.
CONCLUSION
We find that making TPDS more inclusive did lead to a significant increase in its coverage: More households bought more rice from fair-price shops at cheaper prices in the reform states. While there has been some improvement in coverage of TPDS across India during this period, the improvement was significantly larger in states that made the system more inclusive and implemented this inclusive system with greater administrative rigor. We also find evidence that increased purchase of cheaper rice from fairprice shops in Chhattisgarh had a positive impact on consumption of other food items like pulses, edible oil, vegetables, and sugar and also on expenditure on nonfood items. Thus, increase in implicit transfer in the form of cheaper rice worked somewhat like a direct income-transfer program. Savings on rice were used to increase expenditure on other items.
The treatment states implemented three major changes in the PDS: They made grains cheaper than the central issue price, they expanded the group of households entitled to the cheaper grains beyond the original list of AAY and BPL households, and they implemented administrative reforms to control diversion of subsidized grains from PDS and to ensure its timely delivery to fair-price shops.
One major limitation of our paper is that we have not been able to isolate the impact of these three important policy changes; that is, we do not know the relative impacts of these different steps on our outcomes of interest. However, we present suggestive evidence to show that increasing subsidy on rice (or other cereals) sold through PDS and expanding the target group, as NFSA does, works only when accompanied by administrative efforts to improve delivery of grains to households and control diversion of cheap grains to the open market. West Bengal is a case in point. TPDS became more generous there, but it did not become better. We do not prove this, but it is likely that the administrative efforts to control corruption and tighten the logistics could contribute just as much, if not more, to the improvement in performance of TPDS than the increase in levels and subsidy and the number of households who are entitled to it. The massive improvement in the performance of TPDS in Bihar after 2009/2010, mentioned earlier, supports this contention. PDS improved in Bihar even when pricing and targeting policies remained unchanged. Increase in subsidies and increased coverage will not automatically ensure better performance of TPDS after NFSA. Administrative reforms are necessary. Source: Estimated by authors using data from 61st and 66th rounds of NSSO consumption surveys.
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